Trust · CAIQ v4
Cloud Security Alliance — CAIQ v4
All 197 controls of the CSA Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire v4, answered for RiskAlign. Filter by domain, by answer, or free-text search any control — every cell is the same text we hand to a prospect's security team under NDA.
AA · Audit & Assurance(6)
- Yes
AA-01
Audit and Assurance Policy and Procedures
Audit policy documented in `docs/canonical/30_Chain_Verifier_Auditor_Runbook.md` and `31_Pilot_Ready_Attestation.md`. Single-founder operation; written policy maintained in `docs/canonical/` and reviewed at every release. No formal annual sign-off cycle yet — planned post first paying pilot.
- No
AA-02
Independent Assessments
No third-party SOC 2 / ISO 27001 / STAR Level 2 yet. Pen-test SoW drafted (`19_Pen_Test_RFP.md`); execution planned post first paying pilot.
- Yes
AA-03
Risk Based Planning Assessment
Risk register maintained internally; SWOT v2 published (`01_SWOT_v2.md`). Re-reviewed every release.
- Yes
AA-04
Requirements Compliance
Compliance scope mapped in `25_Pilot_Prospectus.md` and `32_Trust_Pack.md` (JFSC AML/CFT/CPF, DPJL 2018, UK GDPR-aligned).
- Partial
AA-05
Audit Management Process
Internal audit only (founder-led, evidenced via hash-chained audit trail). External audit programme not yet established.
- Yes
AA-06
Remediation
Issues tracked in product `issues` table with status workflow, escalation, and audit-trailed remediation. See Trust Pack §6.
AIS · Application & Interface Security(7)
- Yes
AIS-01
Application and Interface Security Policy and Procedures
SDLC + interface security policy embedded in commit / review workflow; see `docs/canonical/architecture-overview.md`.
- Yes
AIS-02
Application Security Baseline Requirements
Baseline: TypeScript strict, RLS-by-default, no service-role on user paths, signed webhooks, CSP. Enforced in code review.
- Partial
AIS-03
Application Security Metrics
Dependency-scan + lint metrics in CI; no formal monthly metrics report yet.
- Yes
AIS-04
Secure Application Design and Development
Threat modelling at architecture-change time; secure-by-default patterns documented in `architecture-overview.md`.
- Partial
AIS-05
Automated Application Security Testing
Dependency-scan automated in CI; SAST coverage limited. DAST / pen-test deferred to `19_Pen_Test_RFP.md` engagement.
- Yes
AIS-06
Automated Secure Application Deployment
Lovable-managed CI/CD; every deploy is git-tracked and reproducible; rollback by re-deploy of prior commit.
- Yes
AIS-07
Application Vulnerability Remediation
Public Vulnerability Disclosure Policy at `riskalignplatform.com/vdp` (see `28_Vulnerability_Disclosure_Policy.md`); SLAs documented.
BCR · Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience(11)
- Yes
BCR-01
Business Continuity Management Policy and Procedures
BCP outline at `07_BCP_Outline.md`. Reviewed at every major release.
- Yes
BCR-02
Risk Assessment and Impact Analysis
BIA documented in BCP outline; RTO 8h / RPO 24h for tenant data (mirrors Trust Pack §8).
- Yes
BCR-03
Business Continuity Strategy
Strategy: rely on managed-platform multi-AZ + daily DB snapshots; founder-led incident response. See `07_BCP_Outline.md`.
- Yes
BCR-04
Business Continuity Planning
Plan documented; named successor scoped in `16_Successor_Role_Spec.md`.
- Yes
BCR-05
Documentation
All BCP/DR docs in `docs/canonical/`; published Trust Pack §7.
- No
BCR-06
Business Continuity Exercises
No live BCP exercise executed yet. Tabletop scheduled for Q3 2026 once first pilot live.
- Yes
BCR-07
Communication
Status page at `riskalignplatform.com/status`; incident communication via direct email to tenant admins.
- Yes
BCR-08
Backup
Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU) daily automated backups; point-in-time recovery enabled. See Trust Pack §2.
- Yes
BCR-09
Disaster Response Plan
DR plan documented in `07_BCP_Outline.md`; relies on managed-platform multi-AZ failover.
- No
BCR-10
Response Plan Exercise
Not yet exercised; planned alongside BCR-06.
- N/A
BCR-11
Equipment Redundancy
Managed platform (Cloudflare + Supabase EU) provides infrastructure redundancy. RiskAlign owns no physical equipment.
CCC · Change Control & Configuration Management(9)
- Yes
CCC-01
Change Management Policy and Procedures
Every change is a git commit with reviewer + deploy audit trail. Lovable-managed deploys.
- Yes
CCC-02
Quality Testing
Type-check + lint + Vitest required on every change; visual QA before publish.
- Yes
CCC-03
Change Management Technology
Git + Lovable CI/CD. Append-only audit-trail with SHA-256 hash chain; per-page verifier at `riskalignplatform.com/verify`. See Trust Pack §6.
- Yes
CCC-04
Unauthorized Change Protection
Only the founder can deploy; MFA-enforced on Lovable account. Branch protection on `main`.
- Yes
CCC-05
Change Agreements
Pilot Agreement (`05_Pilot_Agreement_Scaffold.md`) covers change-notification cadence.
- Yes
CCC-06
Change Management Baseline
Baseline = current `main` branch + last deployed commit SHA; reproducible by checkout.
- Partial
CCC-07
Detection of Baseline Deviation
Git tracks code drift; runtime config drift caught manually. Automated config-drift alerting deferred.
- Yes
CCC-08
Exception Management
Exceptions logged as issues; require sign-off + audit-trail entry.
- Yes
CCC-09
Change Restoration
Rollback by re-deploying prior commit; DB rollback via Supabase PITR. RTO < 1h.
CEK · Cryptography, Encryption & Key Management(21)
- Yes
CEK-01
Encryption and Key Management Policy and Procedures
TLS 1.2+ in transit, AES-256 at rest (Lovable Cloud managed). Key custody is sub-processor side — see Trust Pack §2/§3.
- Yes
CEK-02
CEK Roles and Responsibilities
Founder owns key-lifecycle decisions; day-to-day key custody is delegated to sub-processors (Cloudflare, Supabase).
- Yes
CEK-03
Data Encryption
TLS 1.2+ in transit, AES-256 at rest (Lovable Cloud managed). Key custody is sub-processor side — see Trust Pack §2/§3.
- Yes
CEK-04
Encryption Algorithm
AES-256 at rest, TLS 1.2+ (incl. TLS 1.3) in transit. No proprietary crypto.
- Yes
CEK-05
Encryption Change Management
Crypto changes flow through normal CCC change process; sub-processor crypto changes tracked via vendor advisories.
- Yes
CEK-06
Encryption Change Cost Benefit Analysis
Documented when crypto is changed; default = use sub-processor managed crypto, which has independent CBA.
- Yes
CEK-07
Encryption Risk Management
Crypto-risk reviewed at architecture-change time; logged in risk register.
- No
CEK-08
CSC Key Management Capability
Bring-your-own-key not supported and not on the near-term roadmap. Customer keys are not separable from managed-platform encryption at this stage; a true BYOK answer would require application-layer envelope encryption we have not built. Tracked openly at /security/roadmap (trigger: enterprise procurement requirement).
- Partial
CEK-09
Encryption and Key Management Audit
Internal review only; relies on sub-processor SOC 2 / ISO 27001 attestations.
- Yes
CEK-10
Key Generation
Keys generated by sub-processors (Cloudflare, Supabase); no founder-managed long-lived keys other than API/webhook secrets.
- Yes
CEK-11
Key Purpose
Each key has a single purpose (TLS cert, DB encryption, webhook HMAC, API key signing).
- Yes
CEK-12
Key Rotation
Sub-processor keys rotated per their published schedule. Tenant API keys / webhook secrets rotatable on demand via `/admin/api-keys`.
- Yes
CEK-13
Key Revocation
API keys revocable instantly via operator UI; HTTP 401 returned on next call.
- Yes
CEK-14
Key Destruction
Revoked keys are deleted, not just disabled; sub-processor key destruction per their procedures.
- Yes
CEK-15
Key Activation
API keys active on creation; sub-processor keys per their lifecycle.
- Yes
CEK-16
Key Suspension
API keys can be disabled (suspended) before deletion via operator UI.
- Yes
CEK-17
Key Deactivation
Deactivation is identical to revocation for API keys; sub-processor lifecycle per their controls.
- N/A
CEK-18
Key Archival
RiskAlign-issued keys are not archived (no need: re-issue is one click). Sub-processor practice per their controls.
- Yes
CEK-19
Key Compromise
Suspected compromise → revoke + re-issue + audit-trail entry + tenant-admin notification.
- N/A
CEK-20
Key Recovery
Tenant API keys cannot be recovered after revocation; sub-processor key recovery per their controls.
- Yes
CEK-21
Key Inventory Management
Active keys listed at `/admin/api-keys` per tenant; webhook secrets at `/admin/regulator-endpoints`.
DCS · Datacenter Security(15)
- N/A
DCS-01
Off-Site Equipment Disposal Policy and Procedures
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-02
Off-Site Transfer Authorization Policy and Procedures
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-03
Secure Area Policy and Procedures
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-04
Secure Media Transportation Policy and Procedures
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- Yes
DCS-05
Assets Classification
Logical asset classification (data classification at table level, sensitivity tagged via `data_classification` column). Physical-asset classification N/A.
- Yes
DCS-06
Assets Cataloguing and Tracking
Logical asset inventory in `data-model-map.md` and `architecture-overview.md`. Physical assets N/A.
- N/A
DCS-07
Controlled Access Points
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-08
Equipment Identification
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-09
Secure Area Authorization
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-10
Surveillance System
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-11
Unauthorized Access Response Training
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-12
Cabling Security
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-13
Environmental Systems
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-14
Secure Utilities
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
- N/A
DCS-15
Equipment Location
N/A — RiskAlign operates no physical data-centre, network cabling, surveillance or utility infrastructure. Hosting is managed by Cloudflare Workers and Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU); their published certifications apply to this domain.
DSP · Data Security & Privacy Lifecycle Management(19)
- Yes
DSP-01
Security and Privacy Policy and Procedures
Published privacy notice + DPIA template (`06_DPIA_Template.md`); JOIC-registered controller/processor (No. 103914).
- Yes
DSP-02
Secure Disposal
Tenant deletion = hard delete + audit-trail entry. Backups expire per `15_Data_Retention_and_Deletion.md`.
- Yes
DSP-03
Data Inventory
Full data inventory in `data-model-map.md`; per-table sensitivity tagging.
- Yes
DSP-04
Data Classification
`data_classification` column on tenant rows; `live_PROHIBITED` on pilot/sandbox tenants until uplift.
- Yes
DSP-05
Data Flow Documentation
Data flow diagram + sub-processor map in `architecture-overview.md` and `14_Sub_Processor_List.md`.
- Yes
DSP-06
Data Ownership and Stewardship
Tenant = data owner; RiskAlign = processor for tenant data, controller for account data. Documented in Pilot Agreement §3.
- Yes
DSP-07
Data Protection by Design and Default
RLS-by-default on every table; tenant isolation enforced at query layer.
- Yes
DSP-08
Data Privacy by Design and Default
Minimum-necessary data collection; no special-category data accepted (enforced via upload guards).
- Yes
DSP-09
Data Protection Impact Assessment
DPIA template provided to every tenant (`06_DPIA_Template.md`); founder DPIA performed at architecture-change time.
- Yes
DSP-10
Sensitive Data Transfer
All transfers TLS 1.2+; EU-only sub-processors for data path.
- Yes
DSP-11
Personal Data Access, Reversal, Rectification and Deletion
Operator UI supports DSAR / rectification / erasure; export at `/admin/data-export`.
- Yes
DSP-12
Limitation of Purpose in Personal Data Processing
Documented in Pilot Agreement §3; tenant data not used for product improvement without explicit consent.
- Yes
DSP-13
Personal Data Sub-processing
Public sub-processor list at `riskalignplatform.com/trust` and in `14_Sub_Processor_List.md`; changes notified 30 days in advance per Pilot Agreement §7.
- Yes
DSP-14
Disclosure of Data Sub-processors
Public sub-processor list at `riskalignplatform.com/trust` and in `14_Sub_Processor_List.md`; changes notified 30 days in advance per Pilot Agreement §7.
- Yes
DSP-15
Limitation of Production Data Use
Production data never used in dev/test; pilot/sandbox tenants flagged with `live_PROHIBITED` and enforce upload guards.
- Yes
DSP-16
Data Retention and Deletion
Published policy at `15_Data_Retention_and_Deletion.md`; tenant-level retention overrideable per Pilot Agreement.
- Yes
DSP-17
Sensitive Data Protection
No special-category data accepted; enforced by upload guards + onboarding checklist.
- Yes
DSP-18
Disclosure Notification
Breach-notification SLA: 24h to tenant + JOIC per DPJL 2018; documented in BCP outline and Pilot Agreement §8.
- Yes
DSP-19
Data Location
All tenant data resides in EU (Lovable Cloud EU region). Cloudflare edge does not persist tenant data.
GRC · Governance, Risk & Compliance(8)
- Yes
GRC-01
Governance Program Policy and Procedures
Governance documented in `docs/canonical/` (Trust Pack, Sub-processor list, BCP, DPIA, Retention, VDP, AI-use disclosure).
- Yes
GRC-02
Risk Management Program
Internal risk register + SWOT (`01_SWOT_v2.md`); reviewed every release.
- Yes
GRC-03
Organizational Policy Reviews
Canonical docs reviewed at every release; review log in `.lovable/handover/`.
- Yes
GRC-04
Policy Exception Process
Exceptions logged in `issues` with sign-off + audit-trail; documented in Pilot Agreement §6.
- Yes
GRC-05
Information Security Program
Trust Pack (`32_Trust_Pack.md`) is the published programme summary.
- Yes
GRC-06
Governance Responsibility Model
Founder is accountable owner; successor role scoped in `16_Successor_Role_Spec.md`.
- Yes
GRC-07
Information System Regulatory Mapping
Regulatory mapping per `25_Pilot_Prospectus.md` (JFSC AML/CFT/CPF, DPJL 2018) and the in-product Compass methodology.
- Yes
GRC-08
Special Interest Groups
Founder participates in CSA / FCA / JFSC discussion channels; subscribes to ENISA + NCSC advisories.
HRS · Human Resources Security(13)
- N/A
HRS-01
Background Screening Policy and Procedures
N/A — single founder; no employees. Will adopt policy at first hire.
- Yes
HRS-02
Acceptable Use of Technology Policy and Procedures
Acceptable-use embedded in founder operating procedure; will formalise at first hire.
- Yes
HRS-03
Clean Desk Policy and Procedures
Founder operates browser-only; no printed customer data; locked workspace when away.
- Yes
HRS-04
Remote and Home Working Policy and Procedures
Single home-office; disk-encrypted laptop; MFA on every privileged account.
- N/A
HRS-05
Asset returns
N/A — no employees / no issued assets.
- N/A
HRS-06
Employment Termination
N/A — no employees yet.
- N/A
HRS-07
Employment Agreement Process
N/A — no employees yet.
- N/A
HRS-08
Employment Agreement Content
N/A — no employees yet. Sub-processor contracts cover equivalent obligations.
- Yes
HRS-09
Personnel Roles and Responsibilities
Founder role + successor role spec in `16_Successor_Role_Spec.md`. Second-operator brief in `17_Second_Operator_Brief.md`.
- Yes
HRS-10
Non-Disclosure Agreements
Mutual NDA template available; signed with every pilot prospect before sharing diligence pack.
- Yes
HRS-11
Security Awareness Training
Founder maintains CPD; will formalise programme at first hire.
- Yes
HRS-12
Personal and Sensitive Data Awareness and Training
Founder DPO-equivalent; maintains data-protection CPD.
- Yes
HRS-13
Compliance User Responsibility
Tenant user responsibilities documented in Pilot Agreement §4 and the in-product onboarding checklist.
IAM · Identity & Access Management(16)
- Yes
IAM-01
Identity and Access Management Policy and Procedures
Row-level security on every tenant table; least-privilege role model (admin / cco / mlro / board / user). See Trust Pack §4.
- Yes
IAM-02
Strong Password Policy and Procedures
Supabase Auth password policy: min 12 chars, breach-list check via HIBP, no max length.
- Yes
IAM-03
Identity Inventory
All identities in `auth.users` + `public.tenant_users`; operator review at `/admin/tenant-users`.
- Yes
IAM-04
Separation of Duties
Maker-checker workflow on regulatory adoption; admin / cco / mlro / board roles separated. Row-level security on every tenant table; least-privilege role model (admin / cco / mlro / board / user). See Trust Pack §4.
- Yes
IAM-05
Least Privilege
Row-level security on every tenant table; least-privilege role model (admin / cco / mlro / board / user). See Trust Pack §4.
- Yes
IAM-06
User Access Provisioning
Tenant-admin invites + named roles; audit-trailed.
- Yes
IAM-07
User Access Changes and Revocation
Role changes + offboarding via `/admin/tenant-users`; immediate effect; audit-trailed.
- Yes
IAM-08
User Access Review
Quarterly access review prompt on `/admin/tenant-users`; results captured in audit trail.
- Yes
IAM-09
Segregation of Privileged Access Roles
`sandbox_admin` (founder cross-tenant) is separate from per-tenant `admin`.
- Yes
IAM-10
Management of Privileged Access Roles
Privileged roles grant logged in `user_roles` + audit-trailed; manual approval required.
- Yes
IAM-11
CSCs Approval for Agreed Privileged Access Roles
Founder cross-tenant access is documented in Pilot Agreement §5; tenant can revoke at any time.
- Yes
IAM-12
Safeguard Logs Integrity
Append-only audit-trail with SHA-256 hash chain; per-page verifier at `riskalignplatform.com/verify`. See Trust Pack §6.
- Yes
IAM-13
Uniquely Identifiable Users
Every action stamped with `auth.uid()` + tenant; no shared accounts.
- Yes
IAM-14
Strong Authentication
MFA-enforced for founder accounts (RiskAlign). MFA-enforced for tenant admins on roadmap (queued).
- Yes
IAM-15
Passwords Management
Supabase Auth; bcrypt-hashed; reset via verified email; no plaintext storage.
- Yes
IAM-16
Authorization Mechanisms
RLS + has_role() security-definer functions; documented in `architecture-overview.md`.
IPY · Interoperability & Portability(4)
- Yes
IPY-01
Interoperability and Portability Policy and Procedures
Documented data-export commitment in Pilot Agreement §9.
- Yes
IPY-02
Application Interface Availability
Public REST API v1 at `/api/public/v1/*`; contract PDF in `public/downloads/canonical/public-api-contract.pdf`.
- Yes
IPY-03
Secure Interoperability and Portability Management
API authenticated with bearer tokens; webhooks signed HMAC-SHA256.
- Yes
IPY-04
Data Portability Contractual Obligations
Pilot Agreement §9 commits to CSV/JSON export of all tenant data on request, format documented in `public-api-contract.md`.
IVS · Infrastructure & Virtualization Security(9)
- Yes
IVS-01
Infrastructure and Virtualization Security Policy and Procedures
Infrastructure offloaded to Cloudflare Workers + Lovable Cloud (Supabase EU). RiskAlign-side policy in `architecture-overview.md`.
- Yes
IVS-02
Capacity and Resource Planning
Managed-platform auto-scale (Cloudflare Workers, Supabase). Capacity review at every architecture change.
- Yes
IVS-03
Network Security
Cloudflare WAF + DDoS protection; TLS-only ingress; egress to known sub-processors only.
- N/A
IVS-04
OS Hardening and Base Controls
N/A — no host OS managed by RiskAlign. Workers + managed Postgres.
- Yes
IVS-05
Production and Non-Production Environments
Separate Lovable preview + published environments; pilot/sandbox tenants flagged `live_PROHIBITED`.
- Yes
IVS-06
Segmentation and Segregation
Multi-tenant logical segregation via RLS; no shared schema for tenant data without `tenant_id` scoping.
- N/A
IVS-07
Migration to Cloud Environments
N/A — cloud-native since inception; no on-prem migration.
- Yes
IVS-08
Network Architecture Documentation
Documented in `architecture-overview.md` and `data-model-map.md`.
- Yes
IVS-09
Network Defense
Cloudflare WAF + bot mitigation; Sentry alerting on server errors; rate-limiting on `/api/public/*`.
LOG · Logging & Monitoring(13)
- Yes
LOG-01
Logging and Monitoring Policy and Procedures
Logging policy: every state-changing action audit-trailed; security events to Sentry. Append-only audit-trail with SHA-256 hash chain; per-page verifier at `riskalignplatform.com/verify`. See Trust Pack §6.
- Yes
LOG-02
Audit Logs Protection
Append-only + SHA-256 hash chain (sealed). Tampering detectable at `/verify`.
- Yes
LOG-03
Security Monitoring and Alerting
Sentry (browser + server); founder receives alert on errors and suspicious patterns.
- Yes
LOG-04
Audit Logs Access and Accountability
Audit-trail read scoped by RLS to tenant admins + sandbox_admin; every read is itself audit-trailed for privileged roles.
- Yes
LOG-05
Audit Logs Monitoring and Response
Founder reviews critical audit events daily; alerts via Sentry.
- Yes
LOG-06
Clock Synchronization
All timestamps from managed-platform NTP (Cloudflare, Supabase). UTC stored, UI localises.
- Yes
LOG-07
Logging Scope
Audit scope: auth events, role changes, data CRUD, exports, adoptions, escalations, attestation pack composition, key issuance/revocation.
- Yes
LOG-08
Log Records
Per-event record: actor (`auth.uid()`), tenant, entity, action, timestamp, prior-hash, current-hash.
- Yes
LOG-09
Log Protection
Append-only audit-trail with SHA-256 hash chain; per-page verifier at `riskalignplatform.com/verify`. See Trust Pack §6.
- Partial
LOG-10
Encryption Monitoring and Reporting
TLS health monitored by Cloudflare; at-rest encryption status reported by Supabase. No internal crypto-monitoring dashboard yet.
- Yes
LOG-11
Transaction/Activity Logging
Append-only audit-trail with SHA-256 hash chain; per-page verifier at `riskalignplatform.com/verify`. See Trust Pack §6.
- Yes
LOG-12
Access Control Logs
Role grants/revocations + auth events captured in audit trail + Supabase Auth logs.
- Yes
LOG-13
Failures and Anomalies Reporting
Sentry captures errors; weekly review by founder; high-severity alerts immediate.
SEF · Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Forensics(8)
- Yes
SEF-01
Security Incident Management Policy and Procedures
Documented in BCP outline; 24h tenant notification SLA per Pilot Agreement §8.
- Yes
SEF-02
Service Management Policy and Procedures
Status page + incident comms via direct tenant-admin email.
- Yes
SEF-03
Incident Response Plans
IR plan in `07_BCP_Outline.md`; founder = on-call; successor role spec in `16_Successor_Role_Spec.md`.
- No
SEF-04
Incident Response Testing
Not yet tested live. Tabletop exercise scheduled Q3 2026.
- Partial
SEF-05
Incident Response Metrics
Sentry MTTA/MTTR available; formal monthly metric report deferred.
- Yes
SEF-06
Event Triage Processes
Sentry severity → founder triage within 1 business hour during working hours.
- Yes
SEF-07
Security Breach Notification
DPJL 2018 / UK GDPR-aligned: 72h to JOIC, 24h to tenants. Documented in Pilot Agreement §8.
- Yes
SEF-08
Points of Contact Maintenance
Security contact published at `riskalignplatform.com/vdp` and `riskalignplatform.com/trust`; tenant emergency contact captured at onboarding.
STA · Supply Chain Management, Transparency & Accountability(14)
- Yes
STA-01
SSRM Policy and Procedures
Shared-responsibility model documented in Trust Pack §3 and `architecture-overview.md`.
- Yes
STA-02
SSRM Supply Chain
Public sub-processor list at `riskalignplatform.com/trust` and in `14_Sub_Processor_List.md`; changes notified 30 days in advance per Pilot Agreement §7.
- Yes
STA-03
SSRM Guidance
Pilot Agreement §3 + Trust Pack §3 spell out what RiskAlign vs the tenant is responsible for.
- Yes
STA-04
SSRM Control Ownership
RACI documented in Trust Pack §3.
- Yes
STA-05
SSRM Documentation Review
Reviewed at every release + every sub-processor change.
- Yes
STA-06
SSRM Control Implementation
Controls implemented per Trust Pack §4-§7; evidence in `docs/canonical/`.
- Yes
STA-07
Supply Chain Inventory
Public sub-processor list at `riskalignplatform.com/trust` and in `14_Sub_Processor_List.md`; changes notified 30 days in advance per Pilot Agreement §7.
- Yes
STA-08
Supply Chain Risk Management
Sub-processor risk reviewed before onboarding; certifications + region + SLAs captured in `14_Sub_Processor_List.md`.
- Yes
STA-09
Primary Service and Contractual Agreement
Pilot Agreement scaffold at `05_Pilot_Agreement_Scaffold.md`.
- Yes
STA-10
Supply Chain Agreement Review
Sub-processor contracts reviewed at renewal; security addenda in place where required.
- Partial
STA-11
Internal Compliance Testing
Internal self-assessment (this document). External testing per AA-02.
- Yes
STA-12
Supply Chain Service Agreement Compliance
Sub-processor SLAs monitored via status pages + Sentry.
- Yes
STA-13
Supply Chain Governance Review
Sub-processor list reviewed quarterly; changes notified 30 days in advance per Pilot Agreement §7.
- Yes
STA-14
Supply Chain Data Security Assessment
Sub-processor security posture captured in `14_Sub_Processor_List.md`; only EU-region processors on data path.
TVM · Threat & Vulnerability Management(10)
- Yes
TVM-01
Threat and Vulnerability Management Policy and Procedures
Public VDP at `riskalignplatform.com/vdp`; remediation SLAs documented in `28_Vulnerability_Disclosure_Policy.md`.
- N/A
TVM-02
Malware Protection Policy and Procedures
N/A — no host OS managed by RiskAlign; no user-uploaded executables; sub-processor anti-malware applies.
- Yes
TVM-03
Vulnerability Remediation Schedule
Critical: 7 days; High: 30 days; Medium: 90 days; Low: best-effort. Per `28_Vulnerability_Disclosure_Policy.md`.
- Yes
TVM-04
Detection Updates
Dependency-vulnerability scan in CI; managed-platform patching by sub-processors.
- Yes
TVM-05
External Library Vulnerabilities
Dependency-scan on every build (npm audit + Lovable dependency scanner).
- Partial
TVM-06
Penetration Testing
Continuous automated security scanning via Aikido (SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, surface monitoring) is in place and clean of critical findings. Independent third-party human penetration test deferred until first paying pilot or named prospect request — see /security/roadmap and the engagement runbook at .lovable/pentest/runbook.md.
- Yes
TVM-07
Vulnerability Identification
Dependency scan in CI + VDP submissions + Sentry error patterns.
- Yes
TVM-08
Vulnerability Prioritization
CVSS-aligned; remediation slotted per TVM-03 schedule.
- Partial
TVM-09
Vulnerability Management Reporting
Internal reporting only; formal report cadence deferred until first paying pilot.
- Partial
TVM-10
Vulnerability Management Metrics
MTTR captured per VDP submission; broader metric reporting deferred.
UEM · Universal Endpoint Management(14)
- Yes
UEM-01
Endpoint Devices Policy and Procedures
Founder laptop only — disk encryption (FileVault), screen lock, OS auto-update, MFA on every privileged login. Limited applicability — RiskAlign has no employee fleet. Founder laptop only, with disk encryption + browser-only operator access. No MDM at this scale.
- Yes
UEM-02
Application and Service Approval
Founder approves all software/services in use; documented in operating procedure.
- Yes
UEM-03
Compatibility
Browser-only operator surface; supported in modern Chromium/Firefox/Safari.
- Yes
UEM-04
Endpoint Inventory
Single founder endpoint inventoried. Tenant endpoints out-of-scope (tenant-managed).
- Yes
UEM-05
Endpoint Management
Manual management on single founder endpoint. Limited applicability — RiskAlign has no employee fleet. Founder laptop only, with disk encryption + browser-only operator access. No MDM at this scale.
- Yes
UEM-06
Automatic Lock Screen
Founder laptop auto-locks after 5 min inactivity.
- Yes
UEM-07
Operating Systems
macOS current major release; auto-update enabled.
- Yes
UEM-08
Storage Encryption
FileVault enabled on founder laptop.
- Yes
UEM-09
Anti-Malware Detection and Prevention
macOS Gatekeeper + XProtect + System Integrity Protection.
- Yes
UEM-10
Software Firewall
macOS application firewall enabled.
- Partial
UEM-11
Data Loss Prevention
Operator surface is browser-only; no bulk export from founder endpoint. Formal DLP tooling N/A at single-founder scale.
- N/A
UEM-12
Remote Locate
N/A — single founder endpoint; Find My Mac enabled for personal device recovery.
- Yes
UEM-13
Remote Wipe
Find My Mac remote wipe enabled on founder laptop.
- N/A
UEM-14
Third-Party Endpoint Security Posture
N/A — no third-party endpoints provisioned by RiskAlign.
Stage disclosure. RiskAlign is a pilot-stage product. CAIQ answers are self-assessed (CSA STAR Level 1). Third-party attestations (SOC 2, ISO 27001, STAR Level 2) are trigger-tied — see the Security Roadmap.